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Editor’s Comment
ROBERT P . FLOOD
Jacques J. Polak began his IMF work as part of the Dutch delegation to the Bretton
Woods conference in July 1944. Mr. Polak has served as Director of Research,
Economic Counselor, and Advisor to the Managing Director. He was also
Executive Director for the Netherlands. It is not an overstatement to say that for
60 years Jacques Polak has been the intellectual heart and head of the IMF.
IMF Staff Papers is proud to have been chosen by Mr. Polak and his coauthor,
Peter Clark, as the journal in which their paper, “International Liquidity and the
Role of the SDR in the International Monetary System” is to be published. This
paper contains thoughts and insights from a lifetime of IMF work.
We are particularly happy that the publication of this paper will coincide so
closely with Mr. Polak’s 90th birthday on April 25, 2004. Happy birthday,
Jacques! We wish you many more birthdays, and look forward to publishing many
more of your wonderful papers.
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This paper describes how the changed conditions in the international monetary sys-
tem have undermined the role originally envisaged for the SDR. It argues that the
concept of a global stock of international liquidity, which was fundamental to the cre-
ation of the SDR, is now no longer relevant. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to
satisfy part of the growing demand for international reserves with SDR allocations:
(i) there are efficiency gains, as SDRs can be created at zero resource cost, and thus
obviate the need for countries to run current account surpluses or engage in expen-
sive borrowing to obtain reserves, and (ii) there would be a reduction in systemic risk,
as SDRs would substitute to some extent for borrowed reserves, which are a less reli-
able and predictable source of reserves, especially in times of crisis. [JEL F33, F41]
T
he introduction in 1969 of the special drawing right (SDR), the reserve asset
issued by the International Monetary Fund, was prompted by the desire to
establish a mechanism for the deliberate creation of international reserves that
would supplement existing reserve assets. In the 1960s these assets were mainly
in the form of U.S. dollars, the supplies of which were constrained by the Bretton
Woods system of fixed exchange rates, and of gold. The SDR was seen as a way
out of the so-called Triffin dilemma whereby additions to official dollar holdings
were seen as undermining the stability of the system, given the tendency on the part
of some central banks to convert their dollar reserves into gold, thereby drawing
down the limited U.S. gold stock.
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comments on an earlier draft.The first allocation followed shortly after the establishment of the SDR in
broadly equal installments on January 1, 1970, 1971, and 1972, with the total amount-
ing to SDR 9.3 billion. The second allocation, totaling SDR 12.1 billion, took place
in three similar annual installments on January 1, 1979, 1980, and 1981. Since that
time there have been no further allocations. The Fourth Amendment of the IMF
Articles of Agreement, which provides for a special onetime allocation of SDR
21.9 billion and was approved by the IMF Board of Governors in 1997, still awaits
ratification by the U.S. Congress before it can go into effect. Most recently, in
December 2001, the IMF Executive Board discussed the question of whether there
should be an SDR allocation in the period 2002–2006 and (as it had done on many
previous occasions) registered insufficient support for it. With no allocation for over
two decades, the share of SDRs in total world reserve assets has declined to about
1 percent.
That figure is a far cry from the initial expectations for the future of the SDR.
Thirty-five years ago, one of us, using the kind of calculations that entered into the
Managing Director’s proposal for the first allocation, ventured the forecast that
SDRs might account for over half of total world reserves before the end of the
twentieth century (Polak, 1967). The figure also puts into question the degree of
conviction with which the membership, some 10 years later as part of the Second
Amendment, embraced (not just once but twice) the “objective . . . of making the
SDR the principal reserve asset in the international monetary system.”1
While the opposition on the part of most industrial countries continues to
prevent a general allocation of SDRs, proposals for use of the SDR mechanism
for purposes different from those contemplated by the Articles continue to be
launched by some countries and in nonofficial circles. In the mid-1980s, Executive
Directors from Belgium, France, and India each sponsored a slightly different plan
under which creditor countries would lend to the IMF the SDRs allocated to them,
for use by the IMF in conditional credits to developing countries. The Board as a
whole saw no merit in this unorthodox method of financing the Fund’s business
and rejected all three proposals (Boughton, 2001, pp. 948–49). In 1988, President
Mitterrand of France proposed that the developed countries contribute their shares
in a new allocation of SDRs to a special fund in the IMF that would guarantee the
interest payments on certain obligations issued by debtor countries.
More recently, ideas have been put forward to use the SDR mechanism to
enable the Fund to play the role of lender of last resort without having to worry
about the means to do so. A Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign
Relations suggested that a new “contagion facility” in the Fund be funded by a
onetime, very large allocation of SDRs, with all members donating the SDRs
received to that facility (Goldstein, 1999, p. 1112). Richard Cooper goes one step
further. To provide the IMF with “sufficient resources to cover even the worst
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1In Article VIII, Section 7, and, again, in Article XXII.
2The report mentions illustrative numbers of $45 billion and $100 billion. The leading proponent of
the idea on the Task Force, David A. Lipton, aimed even higher, namely an allocation of $300 billion, with
the participants in the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) depositing their allocations ($205 billion) in
a trust fund to be used only “as a last line of defense to defend the international financial system in times
of dire threat” (Lipton, 1999, p. 363).contingency,” he would amend its Articles of Agreement to allow it to create
SDRs, on a temporary basis, as needed to deal with financial crises and to forestall
creditor panic (Cooper, 2002, p. 99).
While SDR allocations have not found favor on the part of most industrial
countries, they have recently received attention in nonofficial circles. For example,
the Zedillo Report (United Nations, 2002) advocates a resumption of SDR alloca-
tions, and George Soros (2002) has put forward a proposal that would use part of
the SDRs created under the Fourth Amendment, as well as of subsequent annual
allocations, as a trust fund to finance the provision of global public goods and pos-
sibly other development assistance activities. These proposals were discussed at the
UN International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey,
Mexico, in March 2002, but were not endorsed in the Monterrey Consensus.
Against this background, it would appear opportune to take stock of what role,
if any, the SDR can play in the international monetary system. It needs to be rec-
ognized at the outset that the conditions in the international financial system that
gave rise to the creation of the SDR no longer apply. The concept of a given stock
of global international liquidity, which provided a constraint on the operation of
the system of pegged rates, is no longer relevant. International reserves can now
expand in response to demand, and the role of the SDR in relieving the constraint
on the supply side has correspondingly diminished.
Notwithstanding the major changes in the international monetary system, we
argue that the SDR can play a role in supplementing the growth of other reserve
assets by providing essentially owned reserves to many Fund members at lower
cost than they could achieve by borrowing on world capital markets. This lower
cost is not likely to be matched by a correspondingly higher expected default risk
borne by Fund membership in general. These owned reserves reduce the vulnera-
bility of these holders to fluctuations in borrowing costs and thereby enhance the
stability of the international monetary system, which benefits all countries. As the
demand for reserves increases over time in response to the expanding scale on
international transactions, modest SDR allocations are unlikely to result in signifi-
cant drawdowns of total reserves (resource transfers), but countries may substitute
out of SDRs into other reserve assets to obtain a higher return.
I. “Shortage” of International Liquidity and the Creation of the SDR
The creation of the SDR—the end result of a massive intellectual and negotiating
effort that occupied financial policymakers for most of the 1960s—was designed
to bring a definitive solution to a problem that had hovered as a threat over the
international monetary system since the end of World War I. That problem was
the potential inadequacy of total international liquidity and the fear that this in-
adequacy might hamper the growth of the world economy. If countries collectively
did not possess, and could not obtain, reserves adequate to meet the balance of
payments deficits that they were likely to encounter from time to time, they would
feel the need to throttle down the growth of their economies. And if many coun-
tries adopted precautionary measures of this nature, the world economy might
become stagnant.
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standard prevailed over a large part of the world economy, and after the war the
return to that standard was generally considered part of the “return to normal”
(Nurkse, 1944, p. 7). But there was legitimate concern among economists whether
the decline, resulting from the wartime and postwar inflation, in both the real
value of the world stock of gold and in the profitability of gold mining, would
make this possible on a lasting basis.
Ever since the end of World War I, “the adequacy of international liquidity”
thus became the subject par excellence of international economics. It was discussed,
but not resolved, at a number of intergovernmental conferences in the 1920s and
early 1930s. It reemerged as an issue in the wartime plans for the IMF, and again in
the early years of that organization. And, of course, it became the topic of interna-
tional financial diplomacy in the course of the 1960s, leading to a major amendment
of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF designed to create a new type of liquidity
by the Fund, the “special drawing right” or SDR, and to the first “allocation” of
SDRs, on January 1, 1970.
And then, only a few years later, the whole issue began to vanish from the
screen. Since, let us say, 1980, there is no longer a concept of finite international
liquidity that is seen to act, for better or for worse, as a constraint on, or an encour-
agement of, national economic policies. The “problem” of international liquidity
is no longer discussed at meetings of the International Monetary Fund. Even the
disappearance of the problem that enthralled the international financial community
for over half a century seems to have gone largely unnoticed.
What is “international liquidity”? From the point of view of an individual coun-
try “international liquidity” (of the unconditional sort, that is without counting
access to international credit of uncertain availability) is simply a synonym for
“reserves,” and reserves are those assets of a country’s monetary authorities that can
be used to finance a balance of payments deficit (Williamson, 1973, pp. 686–87).
There exists a large body of studies concerning the optimum level of reserves that
an individual country should seek to maintain and this subject has lost none of
its relevance. But if total international liquidity meant no more than the sum of the
reserves held by all countries, in the same way as “world trade” is the sum of the
imports or exports of all countries, “the adequacy of total international liquidity”
would not be an issue. That issue existed only as long as there was a limit on the
total amount of the assets in the system that could serve as countries’ reserves.
The nature of these assets changed over time. Before World War I, the critical
limit to reserves was the amount of gold held by central banks, and the constraint
on the growth of that stock over time was seen as a function of gold production
and the absorption of gold in the arts—even though many developing countries
held a large portion of their reserves in the form of claims in sterling or dollars.
The 1922 Genoa conference attempted to loosen the gold constraint by encourag-
ing industrial countries also to hold reserves in the form of claims on reserve cen-
ters. But while it was hoped that the adoption of this recommendation by many
countries, described as the replacement of the gold bullion standard by the “gold
exchange standard,” would loosen somewhat the constraint on international li-
quidity exercised by the stock of gold, it did not remove that constraint. The Gold
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of an imminent shortage of gold compared to the amount required to support the
monetary demand for it at the prevailing price level, and assuming a growing
world economy. But it also noted, as possible threats to the system, the very uneven
distribution of the stock of official gold, in particular the large holdings of France
and the United States, and the tendency of major countries to disregard the “rules
of the game” of the gold standard.
That standard began to crumble even earlier than the Gold Delegation had pre-
dicted, starting with sterling moving off gold in 1931. The United States, and then
other industrial countries, followed in 1933 to 1936. As a result of the chain reaction
of devaluations, the value of the stock of gold in official reserves had, toward the
end of the 1930s, increased by some 70 percent in terms of national currencies and,
because of the collapse of prices during the Great Depression, even more in real
terms (Nurkse, 1944, p. 132). Indeed, in 1936/37, the fear of an inflationary effect
of the increased supply of gold led to a widespread discussion of the desirability
of reducing its price (Nurkse, 1944, p. 133).
Although these developments removed for the time being any risk of a liq-
uidity shortage, they were not seen as a lasting solution to the problem of
reserve adequacy. The Keynes Plan for an International Clearing Union
(Keynes, 1942) was designed, inter alia, to meet the need for “a quantum of inter-
national currency, which . . . is governed by the actual current requirements of
world commerce, and is also capable of deliberate expansion and contraction to
offset deflationary and inflationary tendencies in effective world demand.” When
the IMF was designed during World War II to provide a regime of liberalized pay-
ments under exchange rates that were to be maintained at agreed par values, and
with IMF credit facilities to assist members in dealing with balance of payments
problems, the specter of a shortage of international liquidity was still seen lurking
in the background. A remedy for this eventuality was built into the Articles of
Agreement of the Fund, which permitted the Fund to “make uniform proportion-
ate changes in the par values of the currencies of all members”—that is, to raise
the world price of gold in terms of all currencies and to do this in an orderly way,
in contrast to the haphazard experience of the 1930s.3
As the IMF started operations, the question of the adequacy of international
liquidity was soon again raised and the Fund issued two reports arguing that the
problem was not a matter for serious concern (IMF, 1953 and 1958). The Fund had
already decided in 1949, after a long discussion in the Executive Board, that the
remedy provided by the Articles, a uniform change in the price of gold, would be
unworkable because if it were once applied, it would forever after undermine
confidence in the new gold value of the dollar (Horsefield, 1970, pp. 254–55).
For 15 years after the end of World War II concern about the liquidity issue
remained subdued as balance of payments deficits of the United States enabled
other countries to rebuild their reserves, both by accumulating U.S. dollars (foreign
holdings of which started out very low) and by buying back part of the excessively
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3Article IV, Section 7, of the original Articles of Agreement. The provision gave the United States, the
United Kingdom, and, had it joined, the U.S.S.R. a veto on a decision for a uniform change of par values.large U.S. holdings of gold. But by 1960 Triffin had tabled his “dilemma,” sug-
gesting a joint limitation on the extent to which U.S. dollars and U.S. gold could
contribute to the reserves of other countries. While that dilemma did not pose a pre-
cise limit, it suggested that, from the point of view of confidence in the system, the
amount of reserves that the rest of the world could accumulate by the withdrawal of
gold from the United States plus the buildup of foreign official dollar balances
should not go beyond the point where these latter balances exceeded the remaining
U.S. gold stock. If the need for reserves continued to grow beyond this point, the
world risked entering either a period of restrictions, currency uncertainty and defla-
tion caused by a shortage of reserves, or a period of financial uncertainty caused by
waning confidence in its main reserve currency.
Triffin’s warnings set off a widespread debate on the subject of international
liquidity, initially among leading professional economists, including (to name only a
few) Marcus Fleming, Milton Gilbert, Roy Harrod, Peter Kenen, and Fritz
Machlup.4As the official community—treasuries and central banks—also became
gradually convinced of the realism of the Triffin dilemma, at least as a contin-
gency with a degree of probability that could not safely be ignored, it undertook a
long and convoluted series of studies and negotiations on the subject. These
stretched over a six-year period, from 1963 to 1969, but in the end they led to an
agreed international answer: the creation of an international asset that (unlike gold
or reserve currencies) would have no other function than to serve the need of the
system for an adequate but not excessive quantity of reserves. The method chosen
to bring this “pure” reserve asset into being was to create a facility in the IMF that
was authorized, under strict safeguards against abuse, to create and annul (“allo-
cate” and “cancel”) a new form of reserve asset with the awkward name of “spe-
cial drawing right” (SDR). In accordance with its intended function, the SDR
would circulate in the official circuit only; it could be held only by governments,
central banks, the IMF, and a narrowly defined group of other “official holders.”
The creation of the SDR was not accompanied by the abolition of gold and
reserve currencies as reserve assets (official discussions to this effect surfaced
only later). But the future incremental role for these traditional reserve assets in offi-
cial reserves was regarded as minor. As far as one could see, newly produced gold
was going to be absorbed almost entirely in industry and art, and foreign official
holdings of dollars could not be allowed to increase by more than modest annual
amounts without undermining confidence in the dollar and risking massive con-
versions into gold. Thus, the broadly (though perhaps not strongly) held official
view underlying the First Amendment was that the SDR mechanism could pro-
vide a definitive solution to the problem of managing the supply of international
liquidity. In 1969, in conjunction with the adoption of the First Amendment of
the Articles of Agreement, Section 10 of the By-Laws of the Fund was amended
to instruct the Executive Board to assess “the adequacy of global reserves” in
its Annual Report, and the next five Annual Reports contain a full chapter on
international liquidity.
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4The most comprehensive collection of the profession’s views on the subject of international liquid-
ity at that time is probably found in International Monetary Fund (1970).As a prerequisite to rational decision making on the required magnitude of
SDR allocations or cancellations, the Fund staff made a major effort to define the
concept of the optimum level of international liquidity (Fleming, 1961, 1967).
“Reserves and reserve growth ought to be increased,” Fleming posited, “to the
point at which beneficial effects in the form of higher employment and reductions
of impediments to international transactions are outweighed by untoward effects
in the form of inflation and recourse to official compensatory financing” (Fleming,
1967, p. 172). This statement of principle, it should be recalled, referred not to
the reserve policy of an individual country but to global reserves and to a process
of weighing positive and negative effects occurring in scores of countries. As noted
by Kemp (1970), locating this optimum point for the world as a whole would
require someone (the Board of Governors of the IMF?) maximizing a world welfare
function of extreme complexity.
It was always obvious that it would take some rather heroic assumptions to
move from the theory of the optimum level of international liquidity to a numerical
proposal on how many SDRs to create. But the situation in the late 1960s appeared
to bring an exercise of that nature within the realm of the possible: two of the
components of the supply of liquidity (the stocks of official gold5 and SDRs) were
locked in the official circuit, and the third one could (and it was expected, would)
be kept under control by the United States authorities in order to avoid the risks
of the Triffin dilemma. But in fact, a few months after the allocation was made on
January 1, 1970, the assumption with respect to the supply of dollars proved to have
been wrong. In the course of 1970, U.S. Treasury securities held by nonresidents
(essentially foreign central banks) nearly doubled, from $10.3 billion to $19.8 bil-
lion, and in 1971 they more than doubled, to $46.3 billion (IFS Yearbook). Once
the United States moved off gold in August of 1971, protection of the gold stock
disappeared as an inducement to prevent an excessive flow of dollars into foreign
reserves.
August 1971 was also the beginning of the end of the par value system and
the start of a movement toward floating exchange rates. The proposition has often
been made that, in pure theory, floating rates dispense with the need for reserves
(Cooper, 1970, p. 143), and if this were true, the introduction of a regime of float-
ing rates would have done away with any problem of a shortage of international
liquidity from the demand side. As discussed in the next section, empirical studies
of the effect of floating on countries’actual reserve policies in the 1970s suggest,
however, that its impact was at most small, and the spread of floating since then
has been accompanied by persistently large increases of world reserves. But the
main impact of floating on the problem of international liquidity was not that this
may have brought for many countries some, at best modest, reduction in their
demand for reserves. It was that it liberated the United States, and probably also
other reserve centers, from concern about the magnitude of the claims on their
economies held by one particular category of foreign holders, namely foreign
central banks.
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5In April 1968, the Group of Ten had decided to sever any link between their official gold stocks and
the free gold market.The freedom of capital movements and the desire on the part of investors for
the diversification of their assets geographically, as well as in a number of other
dimensions, have led to large financial cross-holdings among the major industrial
countries. Some aspects of these holdings, such as the potential risk associated with
very large foreign claims on the United States, or the shift of the United States from
a net international creditor to a net international debtor, have drawn the attention of
some observers, though not to the point of inducing serious consideration of possi-
ble corrective policies.6 In any event, whether these holdings belong to foreign cen-
tral banks (probably the most stable of all holders) or other foreigners is hardly a
matter of concern. Foreign official holders of assets in the United States (which are
overwhelmingly foreign central banks) at the end of 2001 of $1.0 trillion were only
a small fraction of total foreign holdings of $9.2 trillion, or $6.6 trillion if one
excludes foreign direct investment (see Nguyen, 2002).
As a result of these changes in the international monetary system, the issue of
“international liquidity” has changed totally from that prevailing at the time the
SDR was introduced. Two of the three components of international reserves have
almost entirely ceased to function in that capacity. Gold has become a nonmone-
tary asset; many of even the most conservative central banks are in the process of
selling their gold holdings in the market. The stock of SDRs has become so small
compared to total reserves (about 1 percent) that it has become almost exclusively
a vehicle for transactions between the Fund and its members. Thus the enormous
increase in world reserves that occurred since 1970 was almost entirely in the form
of claims on reserve centers. These claims were, however, only a small proportion
of the total claims on these centers (see the figures for the United States above).
For any particular group of holders, such as central banks, there was for all prac-
tical purposes no limit from the supply side on the amount they could collectively
accumulate. The problem of the global adequacy of international liquidity is no
longer with us, not because it has been resolved, but because it has disappeared.
With it evaporated the idea (which had never taken deep roots) that the course
of the world economy might be steered by a judicious management of the stock of
international liquidity. Article XVIII, which laid down the principle that the allo-
cation of SDRs should “meet the long-term global need, as and when it arises, to
supplement existing reserve assets . . .” can no longer serve as a guide for alloca-
tion in the manner those words were interpreted in 1969. That point was well made
by both Mussa (1996, p. 80) and Williamson (1996, pp. 112–13) at the Fund’s
1996 conference on the future of the SDR, and it has been implicitly acknowl-
edged by the Fund’s ceasing, since 1990, to make the required annual assessment
of the adequacy of international liquidity (without repealing By-Law 10). In fact,
as pointed out by Ahluwalia (1996, pp. 92–93) at the same conference, the 1978
decision to allocate could not have been taken if these words had not been ignored
at that time. Any case for future allocations of SDRs will have to be based on
grounds other than the need of the system for additional liquidity; instead, “need”
will have to be viewed in terms of other benefits to the system, in particular the
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6See, for example, the essay on “How Worrisome Are External Imbalances?,” in Chapter II of the
IMF’s September World Economic Outlook (2002).distributional benefit of permitting low-income countries to hold reserves at a
much lower interest rate than they would have to pay in the market, and a lesser
dependence of the system on borrowed reserves that could be recalled at the time
they were most needed.
II. Demand for Reserves After the Demise of the Par Value System
The preceding section argued that as the concept of a given total stock of interna-
tional liquidity has disappeared with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system,
so has the basic rationale for the allocation of SDRs based on global reserve needs
in the face of expanding current and capital account fluctuations. Additions to a
country’s reserve holdings can be generated by running a balance of payments sur-
plus, but this can entail high costs in terms of forgone consumption and invest-
ment. Alternatively, reserves can be borrowed on international capital markets.
However, while access to capital markets has expanded enormously in the last
30 years, many countries have limited or no access. Moreover, while borrowed
reserves can substitute for owned reserves to some extent, volatile capital flows
demonstrate that undue reliance on international capital markets for this purpose
can be risky. As described in detail in the next section, these considerations argue
for SDR allocations as a supplement to other reserve assets to improve the func-
tioning and stability of the international monetary system.
Before moving to this argument, we first describe some of the factors affect-
ing the demand for reserves as well as the terms on which reserve assets can be
acquired. This sets the stage for considering the case for allocating SDRs in order
to meet the need on the part of reserve-constrained countries for owned reserves
at low cost.
As international reserves are used primarily to finance external imbalances
directly or indirectly through intervention in foreign exchange markets, the level
of reserves would be expected to bear a fairly close relationship to those factors
that affect the magnitude of these imbalances. Most studies of reserve-holding
behavior indicate that such holdings are positively associated with a scale variable
(either aggregate output or imports) and to external payments variability.7 There is
less compelling evidence that reserve holdings depend on the nature of a country’s
exchange rate regime, the degree of openness, and the opportunity cost of holding
reserves.
One relevant scale variable is the level of trade in goods and services. Figure 1
shows the ratio of reserves to imports of goods and services, measured as weeks
of imports, for three major country groupings: advanced countries, emerging mar-
ket economies, and developing countries. For the advanced countries, this ratio
has fluctuated somewhat, but has not shown any significant net change since 1985.
For developing and emerging market countries, there has been some upward trend,
which has been particularly evident for the latter group of countries. Thus, based
on past trends, the long-run future demand for reserves would appear to be rising
at least in proportion to imports of goods and services.
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7See Flood and Marion (2002) and World Economic Outlook (2003).These countries are subject to sudden withdrawals of capital, whether caused
by adverse domestic developments, changes in mature financial markets, or con-
tagion from other countries. The increasing openness of the capital account has
thus heightened the vulnerability of emerging market economies to fluctuations
arising in this component of the balance of payments. Reserves relative to short-
term debt rose sharply in the early 1990s for emerging markets and developing
countries (Figure 2), a finding that is also consistent with the enormous increases
in reserves for these two groups of countries shown in Table 1. Note also that this
indicator is used in the early warning system model developed by Fund staff for
emerging market economies8 and that the Fund has been urging members to give
greater prominence to holding adequate stocks of reserves to reduce external vul-
nerability from capital account disturbances. The future evolution of the short-
term debt stocks of these countries would therefore have a bearing on the demand
for reserves, in addition to the growth in their imports.
Other developments could act to reduce the demand for reserves. To the extent
that countries respond to external imbalances by changes in their exchange rates,
the need for reserves to intervene in the foreign exchange market would be expected
to diminish. This expectation appears to conflict, however, with the massive increase
in reserves for most countries since 1970. Even if a country only lightly manages its
exchange rate and has a relatively closed capital account, it would still want to hold
reserves, and probably increase them over time, in order to help smooth output fluc-
tuations arising, for example, from large movements in the terms of trade. Some
empirical studies (see, for example, Lizondo and Mathieson (1987), and Bahmani-
Oskooee and Malixi (1987)) have found that the move to greater exchange rate
flexibility following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system did appear to reduce
the demand for reserves for both developed and developing countries. However,
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Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook. The classification of
advanced and developing countries follows that in the World Economic Outlook. The list of emerging













Figure 1. The Mean Ratio of Nongold Reserves 
to Imports of Goods and Services, 1985–2000 
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Table 1. Nongold Reserves, by Major Groups 
and Selected Countries, 1970–2000
(In billions of SDRs)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Advanced Economies of which:1 41.9 89.1 196.4 247.6 466.7 599.3 860.4
Canada 3.9 3.8 2.4 2.3 12.5 10.1 24.5
Hong Kong SAR . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.3 37.3 82.5
Japan 4.3 10.2 19.3 24.3 55.2 123.3 272.4
Korea 0.6 0.7 2.3 2.6 10.4 22.0 73.8
Emerging Markets of which:1 8.8 42.3 70.9 93.8 100.3 278.2 470.0
China . . . . . . 2.0 11.6 20.8 50.7 129.2
India 0.8 0.9 5.4 5.8 1.1 12.1 29.1
Mexico 0.6 1.2 2.3 4.5 6.9 11.3 27.3
Poland . . . . . . 0.1 0.8 3.2 9.9 20.4
Developing Countries 2 of which:1 3.7 9.4 25.5 25.5 19.2 31.1 68.5
Algeria 0.1 1.0 3.0 2.6 0.5 1.3 9.2
Kuwait 0.1 1.3 3.1 5.0 1.4 2.4 5.4
Libya 1.5 1.8 10.3 5.4 4.1 4.1 9.6
United Arab Emirates . . . 0.8 1.6 2.9 3.2 5.0 10.4
Total3 54.3 140.8 292.8 366.9 586.1 908.7 1,398.9
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
1 Economies with the largest increase in reserves (in billions of SDRs) between 1995 and 2000.
2 Excluding emerging market economies.
3 The increase in total world reserves between 1970 and 1995 is slightly overstated because data
for a few economies became available only in the latter part of the period.
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Figure 2. The Median Ratio of Nongold Reserves 
to Short-Term Debt, 1985–2000Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) find that the breakup of Bretton Woods had a much less
significant impact on exchange rate regimes than generally believed.9 This may
explain why apparently floating rates appear to have caused only a modest reduction
in the demand for reserves. Moreover, even with a pure float, in countries where the
banking system is exposed to foreign currency risk, the central bank may wish to
hold large reserves in order to be able to stem a run on domestic currency deposits.
As noted in the preceding section, there is nothing in the present international
monetary system that stands in the way of monetary authorities achieving their
desired reserve holdings, subject, of course, to the cost considerations they face.
These reserves are overwhelmingly in the form of foreign exchange, with the U.S.
dollar comprising about two-thirds of the total in the last three years.10 As the
reserve-currency countries or areas (United States, EMU, Japan, and the United
Kingdom) have floating exchange rates and up to now have faced few or no con-
straints in increasing their liabilities to foreign official holders, there is essentially
no limit to the expansion of reserves in this form. Hence, except for the SDR, the
stock of international reserves is fully demand determined.
However, the terms on which countries can increase their stock of reserves
vary widely. Most advanced countries can borrow reserves at interest rates that are
only marginally higher than the return on reserve assets. Thus, as long as there is
little or no credit risk associated with lending to these countries, they can satis-
factorily finance increases in desired reserve holdings by borrowing in international
capital markets and have no need for an SDR allocation to supplement reserves,
although they may find it useful to hold a portion of their reserves in the form of
SDRs for the purpose of portfolio diversification.
The great majority of Fund members—broadly speaking, the nonindustrial
countries—does not share this privileged position. Emerging market borrowers
generally face much higher interest rates on their sovereign bonds, and these rates
vary considerably over time. Figure 3 depicts the EMBI sovereign spread (an aver-
age across emerging markets) from 1992 to the present. Only twice—most recently
in the second half of 1997 before the onset of the Asian crisis—did this spread dip
below 400 basis points; for the ten-year period it has averaged around 800 basis
points. Moreover, the cost of private market financing to emerging markets fluctu-
ates sharply in response to both conditions in emerging markets themselves—for
example, the Mexican and Russian crises—and developments in mature markets.
Thus for most of these economies, the cost of acquiring and holding international
reserves is substantial and subject to considerable uncertainty.
The acquisition of reserves tends to be even more costly for the majority of
Fund members that do not have the option of borrowing foreign exchange reserves
in private markets.11 For these countries, which include most low-income devel-
oping countries as well as many transition countries, the primary means of obtain-
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9Looking at market-determined exchange rates, they find that it is difficult to detect any change in
exchange rate behavior for many countries, with the demise of the Bretton Woods system manifested
largely in the shift to floating of the U.S. dollar, the yen, and the deutsche mark.
10See IMF Annual Report 2002, Appendix I, International Reserves.
11Members may also have access to official sources of borrowing and grants, but these resources are
typically earmarked for development purposes rather than held as reserves.ing reserves is by reducing domestic demand and therefore imports, which
imposes a heavy cost in terms of forgone consumption and investment.
III. The Role for the SDR in the Post Bretton Woods System
Table 1 (above) showed that, notwithstanding any shift to greater flexibility in
exchange rates, world reserves have increased by 25 times in the last 30 years.
There are no strong grounds to doubt that reserves will continue to show a posi-
tive trend. Should some of this growth in demand for international reserves be met
by modest allocations of SDRs?
The Cost Advantage of Providing Reserves in the Form of SDRs
Our answer to this question is in the affirmative, as we find persuasive the case
made by Mussa (1996) for resuming allocations on the ground that SDRs can be
created essentially costlessly, whereas reserves acquired by running a current
account surplus or by borrowing in capital markets involve real costs for a country.
Recipients of SDR allocations pay the SDR rate of interest on their cumulative allo-
cations (plus a very small assessment to cover the costs of administering the SDR
Department) and receive the same rate of interest on their total SDR holdings. For
countries that hold their entire cumulative allocation, the net carrying cost of these
reserves is effectively zero. If a country makes net use of its SDR allocation, it
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Source: JP Morgan Chase emerging market bond index (Brady narrow) sovereign spread.











Figure 3. Emerging Market Bond Spread, 1992–2002 (mid-September) 
(Basis points)incurs a net cost based on the SDR interest rate. In this way, the net user of SDRs
compensates the net holder at the SDR interest rate for the real resources acquired
in the drawdown of reserves.
Thus there are efficiency gains for the world economy if SDR allocations sub-
stitute, at least in part, for reserves that otherwise would be acquired by running a
current account surplus or by borrowing on world capital markets. The substitu-
tion of an outside reserve asset, the SDR, for reserves in the form of liabilities of
reserve currency countries creates seigniorage gains, similar to the substitution of
domestic fiat money for commodity money such as gold.12 Given that the vast
majority of Fund members face high borrowing costs or high real opportunity costs,
it seems reasonable that at least part of their reserve holdings be met costlessly
through SDR allocations. Their savings on the cost of reserve accumulation could
then be used for domestic consumption or investment.
The Risk Implications of SDR Allocations
It can be argued, however, that the assumption that SDR allocations provide
reserves at no cost to Fund members that are seen by the market as poor credit risks
fails to take into account the risk of default on the part of those countries.13 The
interest rate spread on market borrowing is generally regarded as the premium that
private lenders require as compensation for the risk that borrowers will not fully
comply with the terms of the loan contract.
That argument appears to proceed from the assumption that the provision of
reserves through allocations of SDRs would leave the risk of default unchanged,
but reallocate it between private lenders and the Fund. On the one hand, if net
users of SDRs meet their SDR obligations without exception, the Fund member-
ship faces no credit risk,14 but private lenders to these countries face higher credit
risks, reflecting the perception of seniority accorded to obligations to the IMF, and
would therefore charge higher spreads. In this case there may be no net cost savings
to some users of SDRs, as what they gain from low-cost SDRs would be matched
by higher spreads. On the other hand, if account is taken of the possibility that
some Fund members may default on their SDR obligations (a risk that could only
materialize in the remote event of cancellation of SDRs or liquidation of the SDR
Department), the default risk would be shared between the Fund membership and
the private sector.15 Thus, to the extent that additional allocations raise the risk that
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12When the SDR interest rate was originally set at 1.5 percent, SDR allocations conferred significant
seigniorage benefits, which generated proposals to link SDR allocations to aid for developing countries.
Now that the SDR interest rate is market-determined, attention has shifted to the benefits accruing to coun-
tries that face costs of acquiring reserves substantially above the SDR interest rate.
13For a discussion of this point, see IMF (2001).
14The Fund automatically debits a member’s SDR account for the interest due. But once this account
has been reduced to zero, the member must purchase enough SDRs to cover the interest cost.
15There are currently six members in arrears on their SDR charges: Afghanistan, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan (amounting to SDR 104 million or 0.5 percent of
allocations). Such arrears do not give rise to an interest risk for net holders because the Fund is required
under Article XX, Section 1, to pay SDR holders the full amount of SDR interest; this is achieved by issu-
ing SDRs to meet any shortfall, which are cancelled as overdue SDR charges are settled.there will be losses from members who default on their SDR obligations, such
allocation may not prove completely costless for Fund members.
Against this increase in risk are two factors that go in the other direction. First,
the substitution of SDRs for borrowed reserves would save borrowing countries
interest charges, which would make them better credit risks from the point of view
of private credit markets and thus tend to lower credit spreads. It would also
reduce the default risk of members in the event of liquidation or cancellation.
Second, reserves supplied by SDR allocations would tend to reduce systemic
risk and thereby tend to reduce default risk on the part of individual countries. This
is the case because they are a permanent addition to the world’s stock of reserves,
except in the unlikely event of a decision (which requires an 85 percent majority)
by the Fund to cancel outstanding SDRs. By contrast, reserves obtained via bor-
rowing in the capital market may be withdrawn under inauspicious circumstances.
Such reserves need to be periodically refinanced, as otherwise existing reserve assets
will need to be used to pay down maturing debts. Doubts on the part of foreign
creditors about the desirability of refinancing are likely to arise when a country is
facing balance of payments difficulties and in need of more, not fewer, reserves.
In a general crisis situation, several countries would simultaneously face rapidly
rising costs of refinancing, which would exacerbate their reserve positions and lead
to possibly self-fulfilling runs on their currencies. In particular, where contagion
is present, the terms and conditions for private market borrowing may fluctuate
sharply and not be reflective of the country’s own underlying payments situation.
Indeed, in the Asian, Russian, and Latin American crises, market sentiment over-
reacted to negative news in individual countries, adversely affecting the ability of
other countries to refinance their debt. Borrowed reserves thus suffer from being
less reliable and predictable sources of reserves than SDRs, and their cost increases
in times of crises, whereas the SDR interest rate is largely unaffected, and may even
decline. From this perspective, therefore, borrowed reserves entail more risk for the
international monetary system than owned reserves in the form of SDRs, which can
be seen as enhancing the “quality” of the stock of international reserves.
The Use of Allocated SDRs: Additions to Reserves, Debt Repayment,
or Increased Spending Abroad
Notwithstanding the efficiency gains from using low-cost SDRs to satisfy the growth
in reserve demand, as well as the systemic benefits from substituting SDRs for
borrowed reserves, SDR allocations have been opposed on the ground that the
SDRs allocated will be spent rather than held as reserves. This argument seems to
be based in part on the view that developing countries are too poor to hold signif-
icant or adequate reserves, and that they are prone to “misuse” any additions to
them to satisfy short-run consumption or investment needs rather than hold them
and realize the return from having a stock of liquid assets to buffer shocks to their
economies. Their increased spending, it is feared, could lead to higher prices and,
consequently, the addition to nominal reserves would not result in increased real
reserves (see Fleming, 1970). However, neither the facts nor elementary theory
support this view.
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the factors generating payments imbalances. Given this expansion in the demand
for reserves, there would be no reason to expect that a modest increase in supply
in the form of SDRs would lead countries to change their reserve policies and
expand their absorption of goods and services.
Second, it is plausible that countries’ holdings of reserves will, on average,
reflect the marginal costs and benefits of assets to buffer their economies from the
effects of shocks that may arise domestically or abroad. To the extent that the rel-
ative scale of such shocks increases over time, the marginal benefit of additional
reserves would also rise, leading to an increase in average reserve holdings, unless
offset by rising marginal costs of holding reserves. SDR allocations lower the
average cost of reserve holdings, but unless they are so large as to eliminate the
need for reserves from other sources, they will not lower the marginal cost. Thus,
when a country receives SDR allocations at a rate below the increase in its demand
for reserves, it has no incentive to increase its spending, except perhaps by the
amount saved by the interest differential between allocated SDRs and reserves
borrowed in the market.16
Allocations in excess of the secular growth in demand for reserves have
never been envisaged. Discussions of SDR allocations by the Executive Board
have always been in terms of supplements to the growth in other reserve assets,
that is, an expansion in the supply in SDRs that would be a fraction of the total
increase in demand for reserves. But since allocations to individual members are
made as equal percentages of quotas, it is not excluded that an allocation that
constitutes, for the average member, no more than a modest share of its growth
in demand for reserves may well be in excess of that demand for some members.
For these members, sticking to their reserve policy would mean disposing of most
of the excess reserves by reducing high-cost external debt, including (especially
for countries without access to international capital markets) reduced reliance on
expensive supplier credits.
The saving of interest on reserves obtained by means of allocations of SDRs,
which is particularly important to the poorer members of the Fund, is part of the
rationale for the resumption of regular allocations of SDRs—the other part being
the improved stability of the system if a larger proportion of reserves is owned and
a smaller proportion borrowed. A comment is needed on the probable size of this
saving. Mussa (1996, p. 78) has calculated that a onetime allocation of SDR 36 bil-
lion (which was the amount suggested by the Managing Director at that time) to
the membership as a whole would save the nonindustrial members of the Fund
about SDR 1 billion in annual interest. If the Fund resumed annual allocations of
that order of magnitude, the annual benefit would of course increase over time
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16Of course, there will always be some countries for which the opportunity cost of holding reserves is
so high that even modest SDR allocations will exceed the secular increase in their demand for reserves
(which may be close to zero), inducing them to spend most or all of any allocations they receive. For
example, of all members that received allocations in the 1969–71 period, 10 held smaller total reserves in
1989 than in 1969. Six of these 10 countries were in arrears to the Fund in 1989. apace with the outstanding stock of SDRs, reaching, say, SDR 10 billion a year
10 years out.17
Once it is recognized that the great majority of developing countries have dem-
onstrated their willingness to incur the cost of a secular increase in their reserves,
the observation that many of them hold SDRs in amounts well below their alloca-
tions is irrelevant as an indicator of their policies of aggregate demand. A member
is not obliged, or even “expected,” to hold any particular proportion of the amount
of SDRs allocated to it. Its obligations to hold or acquire SDRs do not extend
beyond those spelled out in the Articles, and these obligations were designed to
ensure the efficient operation of the SDR system, not to impose on the member a
particular policy behavior with respect to its reserves. In the past, these obligations
included, first, the obligation to reconstitute after large use and, second, the obli-
gation to buy SDRs under “designation.” Neither of these obligations is in force
any longer: the reconstitution obligation was abolished in 1978 and designation has
become inoperative inasmuch as all exchanges of SDRs for currencies among
members are nowadays (and have been for many years) conducted in the form of
voluntary transactions. Accordingly, members are free to hold their reserves in
SDRs and other assets according to their portfolio preferences. The low percentage
of allocations held in the form of SDRs by many developing countries, and by some
industrial countries (including the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Australia) as
well, is evidence of these countries’ portfolio preferences. Many poor developing
countries no doubt prefer to hold reserve assets with a higher yield than SDRs.
The Allocation of SDRs versus the Provision of Conditional Fund Credit
Starting from the earliest discussions of what ultimately became the SDR Department
in the Fund, the question has been raised whether it might not be preferable to
resolve any occurrence of a shortage of international liquidity by the Fund pro-
viding more conditional credit rather than distributing new reserve assets without
attaching any policy conditionality.18 When countries have to meet a balance of
payments deficit of a more than transitory nature, they would do well to take some
steps to adjust policy at an early stage, and conditional credit would promote such
action. Moreover, for countries that do not have easy access to capital markets, the
episodic use of Fund credit is significantly cheaper than holding reserves that
immobilize valuable capital resources.
In considering this question from today’s perspective, it is important to bear
in mind that it was only in the context of the liquidity discussions of the 1960s that
the distinction between unconditional and conditional liquidity became fully
explicit. Even under the Keynes Plan, whose objective, as noted above, was to
ensure an adequate “quantum of international currency,” access to the Fund was
to become subject to conditionality in the higher tranches. The staff’s 1958 study,
International Reserves and Liquidity (in the drafting of which the Managing
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17Even if the countries that earned this rising amount of benefits from the operation of the SDR sys-
tem decided to spend all of it in additional imports, the impact on world demand for tradables would be
minimal, given the magnitude of the current level of world trade of around $6.5 trillion.
18For an extensive discussion, see Wijnholds (1977), Chapters 8 and 12.Director, Per Jacobsson, had taken an active hand), moved seamlessly from its
discussion on the adequacy of reserves to advocating, in a mild way, an increase
in quotas.19
Thus, it was not surprising that when the discussion on liquidity resumed in the
1960s, some members of the Fund Board were more inclined to search for solutions
in terms of quotas rather than the creation of a novel reserve asset such as the SDR.
But the resulting debate clarified the distinction between reserves and conditional
credit, and the conclusion was reached that there was only limited room for sub-
stitution between the two. As stated in the Fund’s 1965 Annual Report, “ideally,
countries’need for additional liquidity could be met by adequate increases in con-
ditional liquidity. In practice, however, countries do not appear to treat conditional
and unconditional liquidity as interchangeable.” Therefore any attempt to meet an
increasing need for reserves by the provision of conditional liquidity might induce
countries to adopt “balance of payments policies which, from a broad international
point of view, would have to be regarded as undesirable” (p. 15). The same view was
expressed by the Group of Ten, where the negotiations about contingent liquidity
creation proceeded in parallel with those in the Fund.20
If at that time the Fund accepted, perhaps somewhat grudgingly, the need for
countries to hold substantial reserves of their own, it has since made the holding
of reserves part of its standard conditionality. It remains true, however, that
reserves are an expensive investment, and few developing members hold reserves
that are large enough to enable them to handle serious balance of payments prob-
lems without seeking credit from the Fund, and thus becoming subject to the
Fund’s conditionality, whether they receive annual SDR allocations or not. Such
allocations would in any event be a much smaller percentage of quotas than a
member’s access to Fund credit, which under current access policies can reach
100 percent of quota per year.
We have not focused on a precise magnitude for annual allocations, which
would require consideration of a number of elements, such as the demand for
reserves of the countries that would have the greatest benefit from allocations, the
absorption capacity of the system for additional infusions of SDRs, and any
changes in the SDR facility that might make holding SDRs more attractive. But to
give an indication of the order of magnitude we have in mind, these various con-
siderations suggest to us that annual allocations in excess of 10 percent of quota
would unlikely be called for. Fifteen years ago, one of us suggested that the upper
limit for annual allocations should probably not exceed 10 percent of quota (Polak,
1988, p. 182); that would still appear to us a reasonable number. With the present
level of quotas of SDR 213 billion, that would amount to about SDR 20 billion a
year. Annual allocations would, of course, be much smaller if one adopted the idea
put forward by Yaqub, Mohammed, and Zaidi (1996) that if the central aim of allo-
cating SDRs were shifted from meeting a worldwide need for liquidity to lowering
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19Its last sentence reads: “It is doubtful whether, in the circumstance of the world today, with world
trade greatly expanded in volume and value, the Fund’s resources are sufficient to enable it fully to per-
form its duties under the Articles of Agreement” (p. 99).
20Group of Ten, Communiqué of Ministers and Governors and Report of Deputies (1966), para. 29.the cost of reserves for low- and medium-income countries, it would make sense to
limit these allocations to these countries only.
The provision of unconditional liquidity to all Fund members, beneficial though
it may be to the great majority of low-income countries and to the system as a whole,
may allow some “bad actors” to rush to spend this “easy money” on socially useless
assets or move it into Swiss bank accounts. In principle, the risk of such misuse of
allocations could be prevented or reduced if allocations were put in escrow accounts
that would be released only if, or when, the Fund, in its surveillance capacity, gave
the member a sufficiently clean bill of good conduct. Aproposal for a two-step pro-
cedure of this nature was discussed by the Executive Board in 1988. It was rejected
as “inconsistent with the unconditional and ‘owned’character of the SDR” and also
on the ground that it would require an amendment of the Articles. (IMF Annual
Report for 1989, p. 22). A more telling argument would have been that the Fund
would likely have drowned in a policy quagmire if, side by side with its principles
and practices related to conditional credit, it were required to run another set of prin-
ciples (stricter? less strict?) on conditionality for SDR releases.
In many of the Fund’s member states, monetary grants are made to all citizens
who qualify by some objective criterion, such as pensions to persons above a cer-
tain age, without screening for possible character faults. Similarly, the Fund, under
its Articles, unconditionally allocates SDRs to any participant in the SDR
Account. In the context of the “equity allocation” of SDRs that it accepted in 1997
(which is still pending, awaiting ratification by the United States of the amend-
ment under which it is to be authorized), it in fact established the principle of par-
ticipation in SDR allocations as a right of membership. It even carried this
principle to the point of promising future new members an allocation comparable
to that of current members (proposed Schedule M, paragraph 3).
However, the plan for the “equity allocation” of SDRs does contain a specific
and objective criterion to exclude from access to their share of that allocation a
small group of members (about half a dozen) with a particularly bad record vis-à-
vis the Fund: for a member with overdue obligations in any of its accounts with
the Fund, that share is to be put in an escrow account until the member has cleared
all of its arrears. This provision breaks with the principle of separation between
the General Resources Account (GRA) and the SDR Account, but that principle
has outlived its usefulness. It was introduced in the First Amendment to assuage
the feelings of those who feared that the IMF could suffer from any commingling
of funds with the unproven SDR scheme, to the detriment of Fund members that
would refuse to become “participants” in that scheme. Now that all Fund members
are also participants, and SDRs are an integral part of the financial structure of the
Fund, it no longer makes sense to have a complete firewall between members’
rights and obligations in their GRAand SDR accounts, and a case has indeed been
made for a full merger of the two accounts (Polak, 1999). It would in any event
make sense to apply the “no arrears” rule to any future allocations of SDRs.
The no arrears clause constitutes one of the various proposals aimed at improv-
ing the SDR mechanism from the point of view of creditor countries. Others include
raising the SDR interest rate and reintroduction of some sort of reconstitution
obligation. But the many rounds of discussion in the Executive Board of the Fund
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bership as a whole were willing to accept them, regular allocations of SDRs would
become a reality. That result, instead, would require “a change of climate . . . as
governments in industrial countries manifested either a greater concern for the
welfare of the disadvantaged countries, or a greater concern about certain risks of
the multi-currency reserve system” (Polak, 1988, p. 187).21
IV. Concluding Remarks
In the preceding section, we presented the case for the regular annual allocation of
relatively moderate amounts of SDRs. That case is based on the benefits, in terms
of (i) the interest costs of reserves that would accrue to the large majority of mem-
bers that do not have assured access, or only very costly access, to capital markets
and (ii) the enhanced strength of the international financial system as a whole if a
larger part of the world’s reserves is owned rather than borrowed.
It is obvious that that case is difficult to reconcile with the original objective
of the SDR mechanism, which was to ensure that the smooth development of the
international economic and financial system would not be marred by either an in-
sufficient, or an excessive, supply of international liquidity. However, as shown in
Section I, those concerns about the global supply of reserves, which preoccupied
international economists for the larger part of the previous century, have evaporated
with the fundamental changes in the system brought about by the demise of the
par value system and its succession by a world of floating exchange rates among
the major economic areas.
If—and we realize that this is a major if—the membership of the Fund accepts
the desirability of resuming the regular allocation of SDRs, it will have to come to
terms with the fact that the provisions of Article XVIII no longer provide service-
able guidance for the allocation and cancellation of SDRs, and a choice will have
to be made whether to do this (i) without an amendment of the Articles or (ii) by
amendment.
(i) The no-amendment approach is obviously the simplest. It can be justi-
fied if the “long-term global need” is read as the need of individual
countries to increase their reserves as the scale of their balances of pay-
ments increases. This has been the general approach adopted by the staff
ever since the second SDR allocation. With recognition of the fact that
the concept of a quantitative global need for reserves—as distinguished
from the quantitative needs of individual member countries—no longer
has a meaning in the present system, that concept could be disregarded
as a consideration for the allocation of SDRs. The 1978 decision to allo-
cate in the second basic period in circumstances not too dissimilar from
the current situation reflected at least in part this approach (Ahluwalia,
1996, p. 93).
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21The 1994 proposal for the “equity allocation” did result from such a change in climate, as the main
industrial countries became anxious to channel additional, but nonbudgetary, resources to the new mem-
bers that had joined the Fund after the breakup of the Soviet Union.(ii) An amendment to Article XVIII would provide a more radical, but also a
more difficult, solution. Such an amendment, in addition to eliminating the
concept of global need, could at the same time remove the overabundance
of safeguards prescribed in the present Article, in recognition of the fact
that experience has proved that the single safeguard of a high qualified
majority suffices, as it does with respect to quota increases. The Fourth
Amendment of the Articles was adopted by the Board of Governors in 1997
to permit an SDR allocation considered desirable by the membership but
that, in the opinion of some members, did not meet the test of a global
need required by Article XVIII.
We briefly mention these options for the Fund to resume allocations in the
present international financial structure. Any further discussion of these options
would, however, appear premature until a consensus has been reached on the core
finding of this paper that such allocations would be desirable.
Given the rather modest scale on which SDR allocations are contemplated,
one can only be skeptical about both the rationale and the feasibility of any of the
proposals, such as those mentioned in the opening section of this paper for a mas-
sive injection of SDRs in the event of some liquidity crisis that the Fund could not
handle from its quota resources plus the existing NAB.
In the event of a worldwide liquidity crisis, such as occurred in the autumn of
1998, a large part of the financial stringency affects the financial markets in the
main reserve centers. The central banks in these centers, the Federal Reserve and
the European Central Bank, can handle that problem by open market purchases.
Peripheral countries, affected by domestic problems or by contagion, may require
massive support from the IMF, to an aggregate amount that could exceed the
Fund’s resources from quotas and the NAB. But establishing in advance the author-
ity for the Fund to create massive amounts of SDRs in those circumstances (or as
suggested by the Task Force of the Council on Foreign Relations, to use previously
stockpiled SDRs) would fly in the face of the agreement, reached only a few years
ago, of an NAB of no more than SDR 34 billion, and the resistance of the major
industrial countries to even modest regular allocations of SDRs. In a truly severe
crisis, it is far from obvious that SDRs—which cannot be used by the recipients for
intervention in the markets—would be more suitable than loans of reserve currencies
to the Fund from key creditor countries (perhaps as an extension of the NAB) or
directly to the deficit countries.
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